The Attorney-Client Privilege--Identifying the Corporate Client by Muller, Karen M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 6 Article 12 
1980 
The Attorney-Client Privilege--Identifying the Corporate Client 
Karen M. Muller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen M. Muller, The Attorney-Client Privilege--Identifying the Corporate Client, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 1281 
(1980). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol48/iss6/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-IDENTIFYING THE
CORPORATE CLIENT
INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between an attorney
and his client from disclosure, provided that the communications pertain to
the legal advice sought by the client.' A corporation qualifies as a client for
the purposes of asserting this privilege. 2 Conflicting views have emerged,
however, as to the identity of the corporate client. 3 The divergent approaches
used by the federal courts to determine whether a specific corporate employee
is accorded client status illustrate this controversy. 4
1. Wigmore offers the following definition: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived." 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961 & Supp. 1979) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis deleted). The attorney-client privilege is the oldest recognized privilege
protecting confidential communications. Id. § 2290, at 542; see United States v. Louisville &
Nashville RR., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (noting the privilege's well established role in the
American legal system).
2. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,
319 & n.7, 323 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); McLaughlin, The Treatment of
Attorney-Client and Related Privileges in the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts, 26 Rec. 30, 32 (1971); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 953, 954 (1956).
3. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Fay, 451 F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 197 1); C. McCormick, Handbook of
the Law of Evidence § 87, at 178-89 (2d ed. 1972).
4. See 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence 503(b)[04], at 503-40 to -48; McLaughlin,
supra note 2, at 32; Note, Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporate Communi-
cations, 48 U. Cin. L. Rev. 819, 821-27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Communications];
47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 413, 417-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Subject Matter]; 57 N.C.L. Rev.
306, 311-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as New Rules]; 40 Ohio St. L.J. 699, 703-06 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Self Evaluative Report]. Various courts have formulated distinct approaches
for identifying the corporate client. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609
(8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (modified subject matter test); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (subject matter test), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400
U.S. 348 (1971); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978) (own
subject matter test); City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485
(E.D. Pa.) (control group test), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); D.I. Chadbourne,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736-38, 388 P.2d 700, 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477-78
(1964) (en banc) (11 part subject matter-type test).
This Note is limited to the corporate client identification issue and does not deal with issues
surrounding other elements of the privilege definition, e.g., note 149 infra. It also does not
attempt to deal with the difficult question of when shareholder communications with counsel
would be privileged, see Simon, supra note 2, at 966-69, or the extent to which a corporation may
assert the privilege to deny shareholders access to communications between the corporation and
counsel when the shareholders institute a derivative suit. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d
1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Finally, no distinction is made between in-house and outside counsel. This
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The particular approach adopted reflects the priority attached to one of two
competing policies-the maintenance of open communications between the
attorney and his client, and the goal of broad discovery advocated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (federal rules).5 The assurances of
confidentiality that necessarily accompany a liberal construction of the privi-
lege6 effectively foster open communications between the attorney and his
client.7 Nevertheless, such an expansive interpretation of the privilege shields
these communications from discovery by an adversary. 8 Advocates of a broad
is generally viewed as irrelevant in determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968) (in-house counsel are within the
scope of the privilege); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977)
(determination of privileged nature of communications between attorney and client relating to
patent application does not depend on attorney's status as outside or in-house counsel); Bur-
lington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D. Md. 1974) (in-house counsel are "within the
purview of the attorney-client privilege under the same circumstances as 'outside' counsel");
Hasso v. Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("house counsel does not stand in
any different shoes" than outside counsel in regard to the attorney-client privilege); Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (house
counsel are not excluded from definition of attorney-client privilege, although they must act as
lawyers in connection with the communication); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 375, 360 (D. Mass. 1950) (there are insufficient differences to distinguish in-house from
outside counsel for purposes of the attorney-client privilege), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (court
indicates there may be a reason to distinguish in-house and outside counsel for purposes of the
privilege).
5. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Del. 1962)
(policy considerations of privilege clash with broad discovery aims of federal rules); Comerclo E
Industria Continental v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 19 F.R.D. 513, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (court
presented with conflict when discovery is opposed by claim of attorney-client privilege); 1979
Wash. U.L.Q. 265, 268 (privilege conflicts with truth seeking goals of pretrial discovery)
[hereinafter cited as Alternative Test]. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides: "Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added); see Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19,
35, 229 S.E.2d 191, 201 (1976) (protection accorded attorney-client privilege under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26 is absolute and identical in scope to traditional privilege).
6. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1960)
(following the broad approach to the privilege); Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications-The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 360,
369 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Setting].
7. See Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 369. Assuring confidentiality encourages open
discussions between an attorney and his client. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); United States v.
IBM, 66 F.R.D. 206, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note
1, § 2291, at 545.
8. See note 5 supra. Privileged communications are not subject to discovery.
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scope of privilege acknowledge that this limitation on discovery might result
in the suppression of relevant evidence.9 They contend, however, that this
drawback is outweighed by the benefits that result when clients can safely
make full disclosure to their attorneys. 10
Conversely, proponents of broad discovery argue that the adversary system
is best served by the disclosure of all relevant facts, I" and therefore advocate
a strict construction of the privilege.' 2 The implementation of broad discovery
goals at the expense of any privilege, however, contravenes the express
wording of federal rule 26(b)(1). 13 To resolve this dispute, it is necessary to
determine which corporate employees are entitled to privileged status as
clients. It becomes readily apparent that the delineation of clients and
nonclients within the corporate employee hierarchy determines the scope of
the privilege. When employees are designated as outside the corporate-client
circle, they are not entitled to confidential communications with the corpora-
tion's attorney, and communications between these employees and counsel are
discoverable. 14 Unfortunately, the widely divergent standards that are
applied result in a wavering line of demarcation.'"
This Note examines the various approaches used to identify the corporate
client, 16 within the framework of the open communications-broad discover),
9. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 87-89 tD
Del. 1962); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
10. See Comercio E Industria Continental v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 19 FIRD 513. 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); note 9 supra.
11. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(Henley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975). See also 8 1. Wigmore, supra
note 1, § 2291, at 549-51 (arguments made by Jeremy Bentham and Lord Langdale). Bentham's
premise is that only the guilty need fear the truth: "Whence all this dread of the truth? Whence
comes it that any one loves darkness better than light, except it be that his deeds are evil?" Id. at
551.
12. E.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. This is dependent on compliance with any other discovery rules of the particular tribunal.
In federal courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-37 govern discovery.
15. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979); Eutectic Corp. v.
Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 39-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
16. With the exception of D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d
700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964) (en banc), all the approaches discussed in this Note were formulated
by federal courts. See note 4 supra. One commentator has argued that federal courts should apply
state law governing the attorney-client privilege, rather than formulating a federal standard in
this area. Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the
Federal Courts, 6 Ga. L. Rev. 339, 341-52 (1972). Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
76-78 (1938), state substantive law should be applied by federal courts when the use of the federal
forum depends on diversity jurisdiction. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-74 (1965). In
these situations, federal courts should consider privileges a part of state substantive law. Fed. R.
Evid. 501 ("in civil actions and proceedings ... [in] which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege ... shall be determined in accordance with State law"); C. Wright, Handbook of the
Law of Federal Courts § 81, at 404 (3d ed. 1976) (state privilege law applies when state law
controls substantive rule of decision). Application of state privilege law has been infrequent
1980] 1283
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analysis. Second, attention is given to the existence in the various approaches
of the essential characteristic of predictability 17 and the desirable attribute of
ease of application."' Finally, a suggested alternative is developed, which
attempts to combine the goals of the two competing policies in an integrated
format.
I. THE VAIIouS APPROACHES AND THEIR UNDERLYING RATIONALES
A. Development of the Controversy
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 19 was the first case to
consider the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations in
light of the increasing invocation of the privilege by corporate litigants. 20
Judge Wyzanski proposed a broad set of guidelines to determine the extent of
the privilege's coverage; 2' the actual application in United Shoe emphasized
because the "noteworthy rulings on the attorney-client privilege" have been in federal question
cases, Kobak, supra, at 347, in which federal law provides the rule of decision. C. Wright, supra,
§ 93, at 462. When there is federal question jurisdiction, courts are split as to whether state law
on privilege controls. Kobak, supra, at 344-52, 348 n.39. Compare Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d
623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960) (application of forum state privilege law in federal question litigation)
with Garner v. Wollinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1970) (in federal question cases,
"federal courts apply their own rules of privilege where substantial state interests are not
infringed"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The dearth of state cases and legislation on the
subject has necessitated the growth of a federal common law. Only one state court has designed a
test to determine the identity of the corporate client. See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964) (en bane). State statutes that define
the attorney-client privilege merely include corporations in the definition of "client." See 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2292, at 555 n.2 (citing statutes). Because the bulk of corporate
attorney-client privilege cases are litigated in federal courts, these are the more appropriate
forums for the refinement of issues and the establishment of precedent. Several state courts have
adopted approaches formulated by federal courts. See Golminas v. Fred Teitelbaum Constr. Co.,
112 Ill. App. 2d 445, 449, 251 N.E.2d 314, 317 (1969) (control group); Day v. Illinois Power Co.,
50 I11. App. 2d 52, 59, 199 N.E.2d 802, 806 (1964) (control group); Ford Motor Co. v. O.W,
Burke Co., 59 Misc. 2d 543, 546, 299 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (broad approach). One
article has succinctly stated the problem. "Rule 26(b) exempts privileged matters from discovery.
Unfortunately, it fails to specify whether state or federal law determines what matters are
privileged." Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 Cal. L. Rev. 640, 644
(1964) (footnote omitted). A complete development of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
17. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 424, 426 (t970) [hereinafter cited as Control Group Test]; see Note, Privileged
Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 Syracuse L.
Rev. 759, 768 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Inroads].
18. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Control Group Test, supra note 17, at 426-27.
19. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
20. See Schaefer, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Modern Business Corporation, 20 Bus.
Law. 989, 989, 995 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Schaefex I].
21. "The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3)
the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
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both the role of the attorney and the subject matter of the communication in
question,2 2 but did not elaborate on the identity of the employee communi-
cant. It appeared, therefore, that the "holder of the privilege... [who was] or
sought to become a client"' 3 encompassed any or all corporate employees.
24
One court that followed the broad approach of United Shoe2' similarly
overlooked client identification by concentrating its discussion on the formula-
tion of a comprehensive test to determine when attorneys in a patent
department act as lawyers.2 6 The corporate client was simply characterized as
those persons who were not " '[s]trangers' " to the corporation.2 7 Conse-
quently, the broad approach enables an attorney to provide a sweeping
guarantee of confidentiality to many people, and engenders the fullest and
most open discussions between the employees of the corporate entity and the
attorney. 28
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and tb) not waived by the
client." 89 F. Supp. at 358-59. This definition, unlike the actual approach, has received
widespread recognition by courts similarly confronted with disputes over the status of communi-
cations between the corporate attorney and the corporate employee. Hercules Inc- v- Exxon
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977); see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 383 (D.D.C
1978); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 69 F.R.D. 451, 453 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 32-33 (D. Md. 1974); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1159-60 (D.S.C. 1974). The manner of application of the privilege
definition, however, has not always resembled the method of application used in United Shoe to
resolve the privilege issue. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1237 (adopting
control group test); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. at 385 (formulating own test);
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. at 35-36 (adopting control group test); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 1165 (adopting both control group test and
subject matter test).
22. 89 F. Supp. at 359-61.
23. Id. at 358.
24. Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 367; New Rules, supra note 4, at 312, 23 Vand L_
Rev. 847, 850 n.18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Direction of Corporation]-
25. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954). Other courts have adopted
the broad approach of United Shoe. E.g., Underwater Storage Inc. v. United States Rubber
Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.D.C. 1970) (concentration on character of patent attorney services
without consideration of who the corporate client was or elaboration on which employees were
involved in the litigation); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251, 252
(N.D.N.Y. 1960) (validity of attorney-client privilege asserted during antitrust litigation is a
question of fact to be resolved by applying the criteria set forth in United Shoe and the cases
adopting its approach); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D
463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (dispute over status of attorney-director of patent department, although
no mention of which employees are clients), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 258 F.2d 124
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958).
26. Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)
27. Id. at 795. The court distinguished between persons affiliated with the corporation-the
officers, directors, employees, and outside counsel--and " '[s]trangers' " who were not affiliated
with the corporation. Id. This all-inclusive description of the corporate client amounts to an
express acceptance of the implicit assumption in United Shoe that all corporate employees are
clients. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, T 503(b)[04J, at 503-41 & n 17; Simon. supra
note 2, at 960.
28. Under United Shoe, confidential status is extended to communications between the
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The viability of the broad approach was first questioned in Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,2 9 in which the district court
denied the availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations. 31
Despite the Seventh Circuit's reversal on this issue, 31 the district court's
advocacy of a strict construction of the corporate attorney-client privilege
exercised a "restraining influence" on subsequent decisions.
32
Accordingly, after recognizing the sound logic of the district court's ap-
proach in Radiant Burners, the district court in City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.33 rejected the broad approach of United Shoe34
and formulated the more restrictive "control group" test.35 Essentially, the
control group test designates as clients only those employees with authority to
act on the attorney's legal advice. 36 This classification, although not depen-
dent on the employee's position in the corporation, 37 frequently encompasses
only upper echelon corporate officials and members of the board of direc-
tors, 38 who generally comprise a small proportion of the total corporate
population. 39
corporation's attorney and any employee. Confidentiality is thought to be a prerequisite to open
communications between attorney and client. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
Whether the United Shoe court was in fact firmly committed to open communications, however, Is
a policy consideration conspicuously absent from the text of the opinion. The absence becomes
less conspicuous when one considers the novelty of the standard formulated. See Burnham, The
Attorney Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. Law. 901, 901 (1969); Simon, supra
note 2, at 953; Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 366-67; New Rules, supra note 4, at 312 n.37.
The corporate attorney-client privilege has been termed "a field that lacks markers, paths, or
even a solitary footprint to show there were travelers before [the lawyer]." Simon, supra note 2, at
953.
29. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963).
30. 207 F. Supp. at 773.
31. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
32. Kobak, supra note 16, at 352. Furthermore, Radiant Burners was the first opinion to
question whether all employees or only a select group should be accorded client status. See 207 F.
Supp. at 774. This inquiry instilled a new awareness in courts faced with corporate privilege
motions. Id. at 352 & n.60. The simple equating of the multi-faceted corporate client with the
individual client, whom the traditional rules on privilege referred to, was inappropriate. See 207
F. Supp. at 775; Simon, supra note 2, at 990; notes 70, 169 infra and accompanying text.
33. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec.
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
34. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
35. Id. The Court stated: "[Ilf the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation
when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer . . . enabl[ing] the latter to advise those in the
corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
Comment, The Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege to the
Corporation, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 281, 291 (1970); Control Group Test, supra note 17, at 430.
39. Kobak, supra note 16, at 372; Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 369.
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The control group test was structured to comply with the Supreme Court's
holding in Hickman v. Taylor4 ° that communications between an attorney
and a witness are outside the confines of the attorney-client privilege. 4 1
Noncontrol group personnel are necessarily unprivileged witnesses, and their
communications with counsel are never confidential. 42 The guidelines an-
nounced in Hickman for distinguishing between the client and the witness
were designed primarily to facilitate the broad discovery provided for in the
then recently enacted federal rules. 43 Although the City of Philadelphia court
did not expressly recognize broad discovery as a goal, it is a natural conse-
quence of the control group approach, and several other courts have based
their adoption of the control group test on this rationale."
The control group test was first rejected, eight years after its formulation,
in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker.45 After stating that the privilege
should protect communications of some employees outside the control
group, 46 the Seventh Circuit set forth a new standard for delineating the
scope of the privilege. The court held that an employee has client status if the
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of his duties and if
the communication is made at the direction of his superior.4 7 This "subject
matter" test,48 in accordance with the court's criticism of City of Philadel-
phia,49 encompasses both members of the control group and certain other
employees not within the group,5 0 thereby curtailing the broad discovery that
results from the application of, the control group test.
The Seventh Circuit laid no foundation for its new approach, other than
characterizing the control group test as inadequate. 5 A detailed explanation
for this repudiation of the control group test was provided, however, by the
Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.-2 First, the Eighth
40. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
41. Id. at 508; see 210 F. Supp. at 485 ("Now how are we going to determine whether the
person making the communication is the client or is a witness? . . . I think . . . the most
satisfactory solution . . . is [the control group test]").
42. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
43. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947); C. Wright, supra note 16, § 81, at 398-99.
44. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F,2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), cut. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); Virginia Elec. & Power Co v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975).
45. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971),
46. Id. at 491-92.
47. Id. The court stated: "[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corpora-
tion's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his
superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment." Id.
48. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 n.5, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
599 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979).
49. 423 F.2d at 491.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc).
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Circuit modified the subject matter test by requiring that the communications
made by the employee be for the purpose of securing legal advice, and that
the purpose of superior's request of the employee to communicate with
counsel be to assist the corporation in securing legal advice.5 3 Additionally,
the Diversified court accompanied its rejection of the control group test with a
thorough analysis of the test's negative impact on communication channels
between the attorney and the client.5 4 Specifically, the court noted that the
emphasis on open communications enabled counsel to be well informed and
encouraged corporations to comply voluntarily with "the complex laws gov-
erning corporate activity. 5 5 The Eighth Circuit endorsed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's emphasis on "why an attorney was consulted, '5 6 as opposed to the
control group's emphasis on "with whom the attorney communicated. 57 The
modifications of the Seventh Circuit's subject matter test, however, were
designed to prevent the potential for "funneling," whereby employers direct
employees to communicate to corporate counsel everything they know con-
cerning ongoing or potential litigation.5" Funneling allows all relevant evi-
dence communicated to the attorney to be shielded from discovery under the
auspices of the privilege.5 9 The Eighth Circuit's proposed resolution of the
funneling problem requires that privileged communications be germane to the
legal advice sought by the corporation. 60 Accordingly, the superior is pre-
vented from directing employee communications to the attorney purely to
preclude discovery. Because funneling is never related to the procurement of
legal advice, it falls outside the scope of the subject matter test.
In In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,6 1 the district court proposed a
53. 572 F.2d at 609. Compare Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d at 491-92
(subject matter test) with Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 609 (modified subject
matter test). The Eighth Circuit held that "the attorney-client privilege is applicable to an
employee's communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4)
the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties;
and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents." 572 F.2d at 609. This modified subject matter
test was based on Judge Weinstein's suggestions in his evidence treatise. Id.; see 2 J. Weinstein &
M. Berger, supra note 4, 503(b)[04], at 503-45 to -48. The Eighth Circuit's modified subject
matter test was the first corporate attorney-client privilege test to be a self-contained approach,
not dependent on a separate definition for the remaining requirements needed to invoke
the privilege. Other courts had relied on separate privilege definitions to deal with the require-
ments of confidentiality, waiver, and legal advice. See notes 35, 47 supra. The consolidation of
the privilege requirements and the corporate-client identification scheme in the Diversified
approach is a desirable simplification in a complex field.
54. See 572 F.2d at 608-09. The court's conclusion that its "modified Harper & Row test will
better protect the purpose underlying the attorney-client privilege," is illustrative of this concern
with communication channels. Id. at 609.
55. Id.; see note 94 infra and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Inroads, supra note 17, at 766-77; Direction of Corporation, supra note 24, at 853.
59. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
60. Id.
61. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
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more restrictive subject matter test, which requires "a close relationship
between the communication and a decision on the legal problem . . . rather
than a request by a superior to an employee that the communication be
made."'62 This test is also intended to prevent funneling;63 nevertheless, the
value of an additional approach offering only cosmetic differences, in an
already murky field, is questionable. Instead, the noteworthy aspect of
Ampicillin is the court's recognition that an approach achieves a proper
balance by accommodating the goals of broad discovery and open communi-
cations between attorney and client.64 Close scrutiny of the major approaches
reveals that this balance has yet to be attained.
B. Analysis of the Various Approaches
1. Isolation of the Corporate Client
The modern multidivisional corporate structure often requires the partici-
pation of many individuals to ensure the effectiveness of decisions. 65 The
broad approach accommodates this structure by providing an attorney with
confidential access to employees at all corporate levels. Consequently, a
corporation need not reorganize an inherently efficient structure66 to maximize
its use of the privilege. 67 Furthermore, full disclosure to the attorney of all
62. Id. at 385 n.8. The court established a four-part test. "I) The particular employee or
representative of the corporation must have made a communication of information which was
reasonably believed to be necessary to the decision-making process concerning a problem on
which legal advice was sought; 2) The communication must have been made for the purpose of
securing legal advice; 3) The subject matter of the communication to or from an employee must
have been related to the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment; and 4)
The communication must have been a confidential one .. " Id. at 385 (footnote omitted). The
necessity of incorporating the legal advice requirement into the corporate-client identification
process, however, is questionable. The two privilege definitions referred to by the court as
controlling already encompassed the legal advice requirement. Id. at 383-84. Furthermore, the
legal advice component stressed in distinguishing this new approach, id. at 385 & n.8, is arguably
not a distinction at all. Alternative Test, supra note 5, at 280 n.89. The Diversified court had
already incorporated a legal advice requirement into its modified subject matter tesL Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609-11 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). But see id. at 613-16
(Henley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Subject Matter, supra note 4, at 425;
Alternative Test, supra note 5, at 277-78.
63. 81 F.R.D. at 386-87.
64. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 503(b)[04], at 503-44; see New Rules, supra
note 4, at 310.
65. Arrow, On the Agenda of Organizations, in The Corporate Society 214, 224 (R. Marris ed.
1974). Increasingly, individual corporate decisionmakers have been replaced by committee rule.
See J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State 63-90 (3d rev. ed. 1978). As a result, corporate
personnel at different levels can play pivotal roles in actions that trigger litigation.
66. See Williamson, Managerial Discretion, Organization Form, and The Multi-Division
Hypothesis, in The Corporate Economy 343, 354 (R. MLarris & A. Wood eds. 1971).
67. Several commentators have suggested specific modifications of corporate operations to
avoid the pitfalls of the stricter tests. See Brown & Hyman, The Scope of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in Corporate Decision Making, 26 Bus. Law. 1145, 1156-58 (1971); Pye, Fundamentals
of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 Prac. Law. 15 (Nov. 1969); Schaefer I, supra note 20, at
992-93; Withrow, How to Preserve the Privilege, 15 Prac. Law. 30 (Nov. 1969). Presumably,
reorganization of the corporate structure, solely to accommodate restrictions on the corporate
attorney-client privilege, will increase operating costs; inefficiencies are spawned by any organi-
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relevant facts, precipitated by the broad availability of confidentiality, 68
engenders the most thorough trial preparation on the corporation's behalf. 69
Nevertheless, the inclusion of all corporate employees within the penumbra
of the attorney-client privilege clashes with the recognized need to differ-
entiate employee-clients from employee-witnesses. 70 Because the broad ap-
proach denies the adversary access to communications made by employees
who merely witness an event, 7' it is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding
in Hickman v. Taylor,72 which did not extend "the protective cloak of this
privilege ... to information which an attorney secures from a witness. '73 The
diagram below graphically illustrates this flaw in the broad approach. It will










zational changes that are not motivated by profit maximization goals. See generally Arrow, supra
note 65, at 230-33.
68. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
69. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548
F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp.
85, 87 (D. Del. 1962); ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 3-4, United States v.
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980)
(No. 79-886); ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 4-1 (1976) ("A lawyer should be fully
informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full
advantage of our legal system."); C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 87, at 175; McKinney,
Privileges, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 307, 311 (1979).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1979) (difficulty
with corporate assertion of privilege arises when communications to counsel are made by
corporate agents and employees), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No.
79-886); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1979) (confronts issue of
extent to which privilege attaches to communications to counsel by employees at different levels
of corporate hierarchy); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (need to determine circumstances in which a given employee's communications to
counsel are privileged); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir.
1970) (formulation of test that extends privilege to only certain employee communications with
counsel), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
71. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); Simon, supra note 2, at 959-60.
72. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
73. Id. at 508; see note 71 supra.
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By definition, employees who only observe an event qualify as witnesses. 4 A
client informs the attorney of his problem and subsequently decides whether
to implement the legal advice. 7- Disregarding employees who have no con-
nection with the pending or prospective litigation, corporate employees may
be divided into three categories for designation as witnesses or clients.
The first category consists of employee-witnesses (Ws), who would not be
entitled to confidentiality under the Hickman rule, 7 6 and are therefore placed
outside the corporate client box. The second and third categories within the
client box reflect the recognition that when the client is a corporation, the
client function will most likely be apportioned among numerous employees.
7 7
This distribution is portrayed in the diagram by designating as As those
employees whose activities incur liability on behalf of the corporation. Be-
cause these people may have personally contributed to the events that
triggered the litigation, 78 the attorney will want to interview them, 7 9 as
reflected by the arrows indicating information flowing from the As to counsel.
The third group, labeled CGs, represent "control group" members-those
persons who decide whether to implement the attorney's advice.8 0 This is
illustrated by arrows pointing from the lawyer at the CGs and arrows directed
from the CGs at the action taken by the corporation. Because both the As and
the CGs perform the functions of a client,8 1 they are grouped in the box
designated as the corporate client.
8 2
a. The Control Group Test
i. Client Identification
Because the broad approach overextends corporate client status by includ-
ing Ws, As, and CGs in the client box,8 3 it facilitates the suppression of all
74. A witness is "[olne who testifies to what he has seen, heard, or otherwise observed."
Black's Law Dictionary 1778 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
75. "A client is one who applies to a lawyer or counselor for advice and direction one who
communicates facts to an attorney expecting professional advice." 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 2,
at 796 (1980) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
76. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
77. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus.,
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); In re Ampicillin Antitrust
Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385-86 (D.D.C. 1978); Corporate Setting, supra note 6. at 372; New
Rules, supra note 4, at 311.
78. See Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews And The Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 873, 876 (1971).
79. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606. 608-09 (8th Cir. 1978) ten banc).
80. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
82. When the CGs and As are coincidentally the same persons, the major argument against the
control group test, see notes 87-88 infra and accompanying text, loses its validity. This situation,
however, would be unusual. See note 87 infra and accompanying text.
83. Arguably, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), sets the boundaries within which the
broad approach may operate. The context in which United Shoe refers to the Hickman holding,
however, would seem to discredit this inference. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89
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relevant evidence under the guise of privilege.8 4 In sharp contrast, little
relevant evidence is suppressed under the control group test. This standard
affords maximum discovery by including only the CGs in the client box. -
This classification is intended to prevent Hickman witnesses from attaining
client status because witnesses merely relate their observations to the attor-
ney, rather than act on his advice. 86
The control group test's attempt to construct a mirror image of Hickman in
the corporate context, however, is problematic. By excluding As from the
client box, "the control group test . .. fail[s] to recognize that many of the
employees [As] who have the business information that an attorney needs to
know before he can render legal advice are not [members of the control
group]." '8 7 The resulting lack of confidentiality between the As and the
attorney can so severely restrict open communications8 8 that the attorney is
effectively left with only a partial client-the CGs who implement legal
advice.
Despite this inflexibility, however, there are desirable attributes of the
control group test's client identification procedure. First, the broad discovery
that results from restricting the scope of the privilege is consonant with the
aim of the federal rules.8 9 This facilitates evidentiary presentation in civil
F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950); Simon, supra note 2, at 959 ("Judge Wyzanski cited Hickman
for the classic rule as to 'witnesses,' but did not explain whether he meant that the 'employees'
here were different, or if so, which employees might be considered 'inside' the organization and
which 'outside' " (footnote omitted)); see Inroads, supra note 17, at 764.
84. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 503(b)[04], at 503-41.
85. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) ("bare minimum of
protection"); Control Group Test, supra note 17, at 430; Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 369.
Arguably, because the adversary's attorney can always question As and Ws as to their activities,
the same communications supposedly freed for discovery by the control group test are never
immunized. This argument is tenuous because "the original source of the information-the client
himself-may always be questioned as to matters within his own knowledge . . . in many
instances the privilege merely means that an attorney may not be called to impeach his own
client." Simon, supra note 2, at 955. This consideration becomes particularly acute in antitrust
and patent litigation, see notes 95, 131-32 infra and accompanying text, in which it would be
burdensome for the adversary's attorney to examine the noncontrol group personnel to amass the
same information the corporation's attorney possesses.
86. See note 74 supra.
87. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978) (footnotes
omitted). See also ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 4-5, United States v.
Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980)
(No. 79-886). The legal advice rendered by the attorney may also be given directly to the middle
or low level management employee. Id. at 5; see Maurer, Privileged Communications and the
Corporate Counsel, 28 Ala. Law. 352, 375 (1967) (middle level management often have substan-
tial input into corporate decisionmaking although they are not within the control group).
88. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
("control group test inhibits the free flow of information to a legal advisor and defeats the purpose
of the attorney-client privilege"); ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 7, United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar.
17, 1980) (No. 79-886); Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profes-
sionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1243
(1962).
89. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor,
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antitrust litigation, in which the corporate attorney-client privilege issue
frequently arises, 90 and in which there is a liberal attitude favoring enforce-
ment. 9' Second, covert funneling of damaging information to the attorney is
minimized because upper level management personnel (CGs) are precluded
from directing noncontrol group personnel (As and Ws) to reveal everything
they know to the attorney. 92 This result is buttressed by prohibiting the CGs
from including the As and the Ws in legally-connected decisionmaking pro-
cesses in an attempt to immunize from discovery those A and W communica-
tions with the corporate counsel.
93
ii. Collateral Consequences
Despite these advantages, the control group test has a detrimental effect on
voluntary corporate compliance with government regulations. For example,
complex statutes often compel corporations to obtain legal advice in determin-
329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947); In re Master Key, 53 F.R.D. 87. 89-90 tD. Conn. 1971); 8
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2001 (1970). But see Blue Chip Stamps v
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (noting the "potential for possible abuse of the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"),
90. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation. 81 F.P-D.
377 (D.D.C. 1978).
91. Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D, 587. 592 (S.D.NY-
1973); Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 562, 564 (W.D. Pa. 1973); In re Special 1952
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1958). A strictly construed privilege also facilitates
criminal convictions under the strongly worded Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78dd-I to -2, 78ff (Supp. 1978 &
1979)). See S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 4. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4098, 4101, 4107 (passage of strong antibribery laws to halt illegal foreign business
practices represents congressional affirmatiqn of national commitment). The two most recent
federal court of appeals cases presented with the corporate attorney-client privilege issue arose out
of illegal foreign payment allegations. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir
1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979). Because of the recency of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m. 78dd-1
to -2, 78ff (Supp. 1978 & 1979)), it is difficult to predict the amount of litigation it will produce.
One commentator has predicted that there will be increased usage of the criminal sanctions
provided for in this Act. Coombe, Welcoming Remarks, 48 Antitrust L.J. 1. 1 (1979), Policy
considerations, however, should not influence the resolution of the privilege issue. See note 174
infra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 35-36, 85 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969). aff'd, 478
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973). The district court noted: "Similarly, the mere fact that Erb [a technical
advisor] was a designated member of the study group does not, in and of itself, establish that he
was within the legally defined control group. . . . Such limitations must be placed upon the
designation of the control group [or] that group itself would be vested with authority to determine
those to whom the privilege would apply, thus, extending the concept beyond the purposes for
which it was adopted." 49 F.R.D. at 85; see Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp.
515, 518 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Simon supra note 2, at 956. But see Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434
F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977). In Hercules, chemists operating at the implied direction of control
group members were granted control group status because control group members did not have
personal access to the required technical information. Id. at 146.
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ing whether their behavior comports with the law. 94 In order for the corpora-
tion to make this determination, it may be necessary for the attorney to
interview employees at many different levels.9 5 If internal corporate investiga-
tion, undertaken for the purposes of compliance, would jeopardize the
confidentiality of noncontrol group communications, a corporation might be
more reluctant to undertake such self-investigation when it merely suspects
illegal activity. 96 Internal misdeeds may remain unchecked until they attract
the attention of law enforcement officials or government regulatory agencies,
thereby causing greater detriment to all parties involved. 97
Of equal concern is the ethical dilemma that arises if the noncontrol group
member who contributed to corporate liability is also subject to personal
liability for his actions. 98 For example, during preparation for antitrust
94. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974); 2
J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 503[01], at 503-12 n. 1 (quoting Report of the Comm. on
the Federal Courts of the New York County Lawyers Ass'n 7-10 (Apr. 1970) (" 'A corporation,
for example, might wish to request its attorneys to make an in depth investigation of Its
marketing practices and to make recommendations in order to insure compliance with the
antitrust laws. Such an investigation would require detailed interviews with employees at all
levels of the corporate hierarchy. . . . [Riules of evidence should not result in discouraging
communications to lawyers made in a good faith effort to promote compliance with the complex
laws governing corporate activity.' ")); Burnham, supra note 28, at 913-14; Miller, Tile Challenges
to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 Va. L. Rev. 262, 269-70 (1963); Control Group Test, supra
note 17, at 425 n.6, 431; Self-Evaluative Report, supra note 4, at 715. The need to consult with
counsel often arises for compliance with antitrust and securities statutes. See, e.g., Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h (1976) (registration requirements); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimi-
nation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976) (price discrimination); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976) (premerger and preacquisition notification).
95. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974); 2
J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 503[01], at 503-12 n.1 (quoting Report of the Comm.
on the Federal Courts of the New York County Lawyers Ass'n 7-10 (Apr. 1970)).
96. Brodsky, Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1, at 2, cols. 1-2;
see ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 6-7, United States v. Upjohn Co., 600
F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886)
(attorney can be used as a discovery tool and lose lawsuit). But see In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (suggesting that although the control group
standard may discourage corporations from conducting internal investigations, "they have little
choice"). The In re Grand Jury court overlooked the benefits accrued by encouraging voluntary
disclosure programs, see note 97 infra and accompanying text, as well as the costs incurred when
corporate officials are compelled to restructure communication channels with counsel to preserve
confidentiality. 599 F.2d at 1237; see notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
97. ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 4, United States v. Upjohn Co., 600
F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886);
Burnham, supra note 28, at 914 ("[slecurities law (both federal and state) ... [and] antitrust laws
of all kinds . . . are areas of corporate law where there would seem to be an immense social
benefit deriving from free interchange between corporations and their attorneys about how the
law should be complied with. Without this level of primary enforcement by lawyers, these areas
of the law in the modern context would be virtually unmanageable."); cf. Note, Voluntary
Disclosure Programs, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 1057, 1057, 1063-68 (1979) (discussing benefits
accruing from voluntary disclosure programs).
98. See, e.g., Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976) ("felvery person who shall monopolize . . . ;hall be deemed guilty of a felony,
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litigation, the corporation's attorney may discover that one or more of the
corporation's employees may be personally subject to conviction. Although
this same employee may be outside the control group, 99 a desire to cooperate
with upper level management may prompt him to divulge all the information
he possesses to the corporation's attorney.' 0 0 The attorney must then choose
between allowing the employee to relate the information and advising him to
obtain his own counsel. If he allows the employee to confide in him, the attorney
may be called to testify against him at trial, or he may be forced to disclose
damaging communications during discovery or grand jury proceedings. 0 1 If
the attorney advises the employee to secure his own counsel, however, the
newly acquired counsel may suggest that the employee cooperate with gov-
ernment officials to secure immunity from prosecution.' 02 The employee's
subsequent testimony or assistance would then be contrary to the interests of
the corporation,1 0 3 the first attorney's client. Because of the aggregate effect of
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court." (emphasis
added)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 12a, 13, 13a, 38 Stat. 730, 736 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-21, 22-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53) (1976)). Although criminal prosecution of
antitrust offenses in the past has been infrequent, see 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law §
309b (1978), it is anticipated that there will be increased use of criminal penalties in the future.
Coombe, supra note 91, at 1; Steinhouse, Dramatization: Presentation of an .4ntitrust
Compliance Program to Management, 48 Antitrust L.J. 5, 20-21 (1979); Wall St. J., Nov. 22,
1976, at 25, cols. 1-2; see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). Criminal antitrust
violations, however, require a showing of intent. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 443 (1978).
99. See notes 78, 87 supra and accompanying text.
100. The person may be a "loyal" employee who wants to cooperate with corporate manage-
ment. See Control Group Test, supra note 17, at 428-29, 430 (lower level employees may
communicate with counsel even if privilege is unavailable).
101. See Brodsky, supra note 96, at 2, col. 2 (information from noncontrol group member
may result in preparation of a "case for a minority shareholder's lawyer or for a government
investigator").
102. See F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Defending Business and White Collar Crimes, Federal
and State § 481 (1969); Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity .4cts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 Yale L.J. 1568, 1600 (1963) (Antitrust Division makes
significant use of immunity powers). For a general discussion of immunity under the antitrust
laws, see id. at 1600-02. The SEC takes a more restrictive position in regard to immunity grants.
Id. at 1605-07.
103. Concededly, even if the employee was entitled to privileged status with the corporation's
attorney, another ethical problem arises. When the corporation and the employee are both being
prosecuted, multiple representation by the corporation's attorney may give rise to a conflict of
interest. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, ECs 5-14 to -20 (1976); id., DR 5-105 (1976);
see In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (D.D.C. 1975),
vacated, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 518, 341 A.2d 896, 899,
aff'd, 466 Pa. 187, 352 A.2d 11 (1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976). It may be
in the corporation's best interest for its attorney to advise the employee to assert his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If there is a possibility of immunity for the
employee, however, it would be more beneficial to the employee if the attorney advised him to
cooperate with the authorities. Id. at 518, 341 A.2d at 899. A suggested resolution would he to
allow the attorney to interview the employee (A in diagram at p. 1290 supra) fully and then
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these numerous considerations, many attorneys feel that the adverse com-
munication consequences of the control group test severely hamper their
representation of a corporate client.'
0 4
b. The Subject Matter Tests
The subject matter tests attempt to resolve the issue of corporate client
identification' 0 5 in a less arbitrary fashion than the control group test. 106 The
subject matter approaches are designed to ameliorate the negative communi-
cation consequences of the control group test, while simultaneously preserving
broad discovery.' 0 7 Analytically, the corporate client definition contained in
the subject matter tests' 08 is intended to encompass both the As and the CGs
in the diagram on page 1290. This is purportedly accomplished by shielding
employee discussions with counsel from disclosure when the subject matter of
the communication is within the scope of the employee's duties. 10 9 As a result,
the subject matter tests encourage open communications between the attorney
and the persons who would be most helpful to him in the preparation of the
case.' 0 Furthermore, these tests better accommodate the modern corporate
structure than the control group approach because they recognize that the
persons most directly connected with any controversy are not necessarily
drawn from top level management."1' Concurrently, the subject matter tests
require him to tell the A to secure separate counsel. The corporation's attorney is more fully
apprised of the events that transpired, but cannot harm the A because the conversations were
privileged. The A then gets the benefit of uninterested counsel, who can advise him to secure
immunity without a conflict of interest. A more extended discussion of this problem is beyond the
scope of this Note.
104. Schaefer I, supra note 20, at 993, 995; see Brodsky, supra note 96, at 2, cols. 1-3; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 6, at 13, col. 4.
105. See note 48 supra.
106. Baker, Lecture: The Control of Documents, 48 Antitrust L.J., 35, 43 (1979).
107. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(encourages free flow of information while preventing funneling and attachment of privilege to
witnesses); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)
(formulates test to remedy restrictive control group approach but indicates privilege must be
limited in some respects), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978) (recognizes need to achieve a balance
between disclosure of all relevant information and the encouragement of free and open discus-
sions by clients in the course of legal representation).
108. See notes 47, 53 supra.
109. Id.
110. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(approving of subject matter-type test because it encourages the free flow of information to the
corporation's counsel); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
1970) (rejecting control 'group test because some employees with supervisory or policymaking
responsibilities should be covered by the privilege), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 387 (D.D.C, 1978) (approach
aimed at encompassing noncontrol group employees with whom the attorney may have to
communicate to render proper legal advice; notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
111. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. $77, 385-86 (D.D.C. 1978); Maurer,
supra note 87, at 375 (middle level management personnel who are considered to be outside of
control group are often real decisionmakers because their recommendations are merely ratified by
upper level management personnel); Schaefer, How Can a Modern Business Corporation Preserve
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attempt to remedy the possibility of abuse inherent in the broad approach." 2
"By confining the subject matter of the communication to an employee's
corporate duties, we remove from the scope of the privilege any communica-
tion in which the employee functions merely as a fortuitous witness.""13
Despite any advantages of the subject matter tests developed by the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, '"4 neither standard has been widely adopted. "15
In fact, both the Third and Sixth Circuits, when recently confronted with the
corporate attorney-client privilege issue, adopted the control group test."16
Both In re Grand Jury Investigation"17 and United States v. Upjohn Co. Its
involved illegal foreign payments made by corporations with worldwide
offices." 9 The difficulty of conducting discovery when an adversary has
offices in many different countries may have contributed to the courts'
rejection of the subject matter approaches, 20 which were formulated in
different factual settings.' 2 ' The control group of an American multinational
the Attorney-Client Privilege in Communicating with "Outside" and "Inside" Counsel, 5 Am.
Bus. L.J. 263, 269 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer II]; Schaefer I, supra note 20, at 993.
112. Corporate Communications, supra note 4, at 826. But see notes 58-59 supra and
accompanying text. Arguably, however, by expressly refusing to comment on employee witnesses,
the Seventh Circuit impliedly excluded these people from the operation of its test. in accordance
with Hickman. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970),
affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
113. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(footnote omitted).
114. See notes 47, 53 supra.
115. The Harper & Row test has been adopted by only three courts. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Hasso v. Retail Credit
Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 172 U.S.P.Q. 46, 47
(N.D. Ill. 1971). In fact, Harper & Row has more frequently been relied on for a collateral
holding concerning interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 511 F.2d
192, 196 n.6 (9th Cir. 1975), aft'd, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d
517, 525 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1033 (9th
Cir. 1974); Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1973) (Heaney, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Diversified has never been solely relied on by any court. But see
SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 597-98 (D.D.C. 1978) (no privilege attaches to
particular communications under control group, Harper & Row, or Diversified tests). The In re
Ampicillin test has apparently not been adopted by any court.
116. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
117. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980)
(No. 79-886).
119. 600 F.2d at 1225. Upjohn does business in 136 foreign countries. Id. In 1974, Sun Oil,
the defendant in In re Grand Jury, had subsidiaries in 21 foreign countries. United Nations Dep't
of Economic & Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development 145 (1974).
120. 600 F.2d at 1227; see 599 F.2d at 1226-28, 1237.
121. Diversified arose out of litigation between a manufacturing company and a company
engaged in selling scrap copper, both of which concentrated their operations in midwestern states.
572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
banc). Harper & Row stemmed from antitrust actions against publishers and wholesalers of
children's books. 423 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U-S.
348 (1971).
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corporation generally consists of executives located at corporate headquarters
in the United States,' 22 and communications between the attorney and
employees abroad would generally not be privileged. The shortcoming of
these two cases, however, is the courts' adoption of a standard that obtained
the best result for the particular factual situations. 123 A general rule should
not be adopted because it meets the narrow needs of one factual setting;
rather, it should be selected for its ability to deal effectively with the variety
of situations that may arise.' 24
2. Predictability
Predictability of result is an essential component of any approach, 2 - be-
cause the attorney must be able to apprise the client of the status of their
communications. 26 If the attorney is unsure of the status, he must convey
this uncertainty to the client, who may naturally become reticent.
127
The broad approach renders maximum predictability because the attorney
need not classify the corporate employees. 128 The control group test achieves
predictability because the attorney is usually able to advise his clients whether
the communications will be confidential.' 29 Furthermore, the control group
122. See Vagts, The United States and Overseas Activities of the Multinational Enterprise, In
Nationalism and the Multinational Enterprise 6-7 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith & R. Wright eds. 1973).
Most multinational enterprises are headquartered in the United States. J. Behrman, U.S.
International Business and Governments 20-21 (1971). There is a trend, however, to allocate
responsibility to regional headquarters outside the United States. See D. Heenan & H. Perlmut-
ter, Multinational Organization Development 70-71 (1979).
123. Similarly, in Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), because no
structured test was adopted, the court appeared to advocate a case by case resolution. Id. at 40.
This is a somewhat surprising result when one notes the recognition the Eutectic court gave to
D. I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964)
(en banc). See 61 F.R D. at 39. In Chadbourne, the California Supreme Court proposed an I1
part test whose rigid structure would seem to conflict with the weighing process advocated by
Eutectic. 60 Cal. 2d at 736-38, 388 P.2d at 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. The Eutectic
approach is in accord, however, with the Advisory Comm. Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence
503, 56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972). The Eutectic court broadened the privilege by advocating a
comprehensive factual inquiry to determine whether the "employees concerned may be thought to
have acted as representatives of the client." 61 F.R.D. at 40. This approach is clearly the least
desirable solution because predictability is unattainable. See pt. I(B)(2) infra.
124. See Pound, Justice According to Law, in Essays on Jurisprudence from the Columbia
Law Review 217, 233-34 (1977). See also L. Pospisil, The Ethnology of Law 25 (2d ed. 1978).
125. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 4, 9 503(b)[04], at 503-44; Control Group Test,
supra note 17, at 426. Ad hoc approaches to determine the scope of the privilege result In
uncertainty as to availability. Id.; see Corporate Setting, supra note 6, at 374; Alternative Test,
supra note 5, at 273-74.
126. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 4-4 (1976) ("[a] lawyer owes an obligation
to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege"); see Control Group Test, supra note 17, at
426.
127. This assumption underlies the confidentiality features of the attorney-client privilege.
See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545 (freedom of consultation between attorney and
client is promoted by not compelling attorney to disclose communications with clients); note 7
supra.
128. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
129. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Virginia Elec.
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test remains the most widely adopted test,1 30 even though the majority of the
cases applying it arise out of antitrust or patent litigation,13t in which it is
often necessary for the attorney to communicate with numerous employees at
different levels. 132 This frequent application intensifies the "bright line" drawn
between control group members and noncontrol group members, 133 because
attorneys and judges can refer to illustrative cases for guidance when deter-
mining client status.134 Hence, this delimiting feature of the control group
approach engenders predictability. The subject matter tests, however, present
obstacles to predictability of client status. First, factual disputes can arise as
to the definition of the terms "scope of employment"1 3s and "direction of a
& Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Control
Group Test, supra note 17, at 426. It should be noted, however, that many courts adopting the
control group test have not applied the test to the communications in question. The attributes of
ease of application and predictability are therefore not displayed. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (concession by party asserting privilege that its
employees were not within the control group renders application of test to facts of case needless);
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968) (no information supplied regarding the
positions held by the control group members, nor why they were deemed control group members);
Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 32-41 (D. Md. 1974) (adopts control group test
but gives no application of the rule to the facts).
130. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1234 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1979). See also
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886).
131. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (patent); In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust
Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (antitrust); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977) (patent); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 tD. Md.
1974) (patent); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (patent);
Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (patent), aff'd 478 F.2d
1398 (3d Cir. 1973); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(patent). The recently enacted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff (Supp. 1978 & 1979)), may also
become the source of litigation in this area. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
132. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 n.12, 387 (D.D.C. 1978); see
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164-65 (D.S.C. 1974); Inroads,
supra note 17, at 762.
133. See Control Group Test, supra note 17, at 426-27.
134. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (no need to
apply control group test because corporation conceded that none of interviewed employees were
control group members); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968) (no indication as
to why certain employees are designated control group members); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 35-46 (D. Md. 1974) (adopts control group test but does not identify
members).
135. See, e.g., Triplett v. Western Pub. Serv. Co., 128 Neb. 835, 260 N.W. 387 (employee
who struck match to light cigarette and started a fire while working on electric transmission line
was acting within scope of employment), rev'd on other grounds, 129 Neb. 799, 263 N.W. 229
(1935); Palmer v. Keene Forestry Ass'n, 80 N.H. 68, 112 A. 798 (1921) (employee whose it
cigarette started a fire while working in field was acting within scope of employment); Herr v.
Simplex Paper Box Corp., 330 Pa. 129, 198 A. 309 (1938) (employee was acting outside scope of
employment when, while signing receipt, his lit match set plaintiff's clothes on fire); Kelly v.
Louisiana Oil Ref. Co., 167 Tenn. 101, 66 S.W.2d 997 (1934) (gasoline detiveryman who was
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superior.' 36 Second, because the subject matter tests have been infrequently
applied, 137 the attorney has difficulty in predicting client status. The ideal
approach must possess both predictability and a proper, realistic classifica-
tion of corporate employees as clients and nonclients. None of the presently
employed approaches possesses these two characteristics concurrently.
II. A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The proposed approach attempts to isolate the appropriate employee clients
in a format that ensures predictability of result. The realization of these two
objectives distinguishes the suggested approach from the approaches presently
employed, which tend to attain one objective at the expense of another.
Furthermore, the approach incorporates procedures designed to preserve a
sufficient breadth of discovery for the corporation's adversary. The proposal
relies on Hickman v. Taylor 38 to formulate a modified broad approach.
In Hickman v. Taylor, 139 the Supreme Court held that witnesses were not
included within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 140 The Court
further held that materials classified as work product are not discoverable by
the adversary in the absence of "necessity [or] justification" as to why
production should be ordered. 141 Separate from the attorney-client privilege,
telephoning company office from delivery site was acting outside scope of employment when
lighting of cigarette set fire to plaintiff's clothes). The ambiguities surrounding terms such as
"scope of employment," see F. Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency § 373, at 250 (4th ed.
1952), and "direction of a superior," see note 136 infra, create a further problem. One major aim
of the subject matter tests is to separate employee-clients from employee-witnesses. See notes
112-13 supra and accompanying text. When the line of demarcation between the two groups of
employees becomes indistinct, employee-witnesses may be encompassed within the penumbra of
the attorney-client privilege, contrary to the Hickman witness exception rule. See notes 70-73
supra and accompanying text.
136. Although one recent case states that a written request from the chairman of the board
and the chief executive officer constitutes a direction from a superior, In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368, 372 (E.D. Wis. 1979), the Seventh Circuit, in Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), merely characterized the superior as the corporate employer. In
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), the Eighth
Circuit held that a corporate resolution instructing employees to cooperate with the corporation's
law firm constituted a direction from a superior. Furthermore, superior is a relative term because
any employee ranked above another employee in the corporate hierarchy is the other's superior.
137. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
138. 329 U.S. 495, 508, 509-10 (1947).
139. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
140. Id. at 508; Simon, supra note 2, at 958-59.
141. 329 U.S. at 509-10; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 89, § 2025, at 213 (1970). See
also id. at 211-28 (general discussion of the showing required to achieve discovery of work
product); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487, 494 (1970) ("a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things. .
prepared in anticipation of litigation . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." (emphasis deleted)).
[Vol. 481300
IDENTIFYING THE CORPORATE CLIENT
the work product doctrine exempts most trial preparation material from
discovery. 142 Consequently, because the work product rule exists independent
of the corporate attorney-client privilege issue,1 43 determination of work
product status does not hinge on the identity of the corporate client.
A. Preliminary Inquiries
Frequently, a motion to preclude discovery under the attorney-client privi-
lege is accompanied by a concurrent assertion of the attorney work product
exception. 144 A court faced with this situation should first determine whether
the work product doctrine protects the communications in question.1 45 Al-
though the privilege issue may not be avoided completely, inquiry into the
coverage of the work product doctrine may simplify the client identification
task if the work product doctrine is found applicable. The rationale for this
approach is the "work product privilege[s] . . . develop[ment] and cod-
ifi[cation] into a set form. '1 46 Because it is not similarly embroiled in a
controversial dispute, 147 the inquiry into the applicability of the work product
142. C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 96, at 204; C. Wright, supra note 16, § 81, at 403; 8 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 89, § 2025, at 211-12.
143. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 89, § 2017, at 132-33.
144. E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 499 (1947); In re Grand jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224, 1228 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1979);
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and re.'d in
part, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 399-400 (E.D. Va. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 793 (D. Del. 1954).
145. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228-33 (3d Cir. 1979)
(considers work product claim first because it is more inclusive than the attorney-client privilege);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979) (appeal can be adequately decided
on basis of work product without reaching attorney-client privilege issue). When the work
product doctrine is not differentiated from the attorney-client privilege, and priority is not
assigned to one of the two, confusion may result. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 598-604 (8th Cir. 1977) (refers to work product doctrine as a privilege and does not
clearly isolate the application of work product from the attorney-client privilege), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
146. SeyfEvaluative Report, supra note 4, at 722 (footnote omitted). Although application of
the work product rule has been characterized as "difficult" and "troublesome," C. Wright, supra
note 16, § 81, at 404; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 89, § 2021, at 178, many of the
problems encountered by the courts were remedied by the 1970 codification of the doctrine in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). C. Wright, supra note 16, § 82, at 407-12, 8 C_ Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 89, § 2023-25, at 190-228; see Advisory Comm. Note to Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery. 48 F.IRD. 487.
497-502 (1970).
147. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1980, § D, at 1. col. 6 (in accepting the appeal in United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U S_ Mar.
17, 1980) (No. 79-886), the Supreme Court agreed to resolve the intensely disputed issue of the
extent to which the attorney-client privilege attaches to communications between the corpora-
tion's attorney and lower and middle echelon management employees). But i-f ABA Amicus
Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 1-2, 8-10, United States v Upjohn Co. 600 F 2d 1223 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886) (administrative
discovery of work product).
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doctrine should proceed more smoothly 48 than the inquiry into the privilege
issue. If the work product doctrine is not simultaneously asserted, or if it is
asserted but found inapplicable, the court may then rule on the attorney-client
privilege issue.
Courts frequently use a similar elimination process as that employed for
work product rulings in determining compliance with other requirements of
the attorney-client privilege that are independent of the client's identity. 1 49
For example, if the assertion of the privilege will fail due to waiver, the client
identification issue can be avoided.150 Avoidance of the privilege issue may
also be achieved if the attorney was acting as a business adviser, rather than a
legal adviser.'51 Courts should continue this preliminary examination of the
other privilege elements because similarly to the work product doctrine, these
other elements are more clearly defined, thereby providing a more established
basis for a judge's ruling than the client identity issue."1'
If it is established that the work product privilege does not attach and that
all other requirements of the attorney-client privilege are satisfied, the court
can then examine the complex question of corporate client identity. The
148. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228-38 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510-13 (2d Cir. 1979).
149. The following cases demonstrate this process, with the indicated privilege elements
taken from the definition in note 1 supra.
Waiver: In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.) (waiver due to unrestricted access by third
party to privileged documents), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); IBM v. United States, 480
F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (no waiver when massive amounts of materials caused
inadvertant surrender of the privilege), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 979 (1974).
Advice: SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D Conn.) (only advice that reveals a
fact communicated in confidence by the client to the attorney is protected), appeal dismissed, 534
F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1968)
(any communication from attorney to client is protected).
Confidentiality: In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 466 F. Supp. 863, 868 (D. Minn. 1979) (privileged
documents must be segregated, and identified as privileged, confidential materials); Gorzegno v.
Maguire, 62 F.R.D. 617, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (privilege ceases to apply when confidentiality
of documents is illusory, abrogated, or compromised); In re Penn Cent, Commercial Paper
Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (secrecy and confidentiality necessary to promote
underlying rationale for privilege).
Attorney Capacity: J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(communications are not privileged when attorney acts as negotiator or business agent for client);
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972) (business
confidences are unprotected by the attorney-client privilege).
150. See Gorzegno v Maguire, 62 F.R.D. 617, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("the premises
underlying the privilege that the communication consist of legal advice . . . and that it be
regarded and in fact be treated as confidential still pertain .... Thus, without ever defining the
'control group' membership, we can only conclude either that the documents were never
confidential and the privilege never attached. . . ." (citations omitted)).
151. See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523, 527-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Federal
Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972).
152. Compare C. McCormick, supra note 3, §§ 88-93, at 179-97 (discussing other considera-
tions governing assertions of the privilege) and 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, §§ 2292-2329, at
554-641 (delineating elements of privilege definition) with C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 87, at
178-79 (limited discussion of corporate client) and 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2291, at 76-77
(two cases noted on corporate client privilege).
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proposal synthesizes elements of the broad approach, the work product
doctrine, and the witness exception rule. First, the witness exception rule is
expressly incorporated to exclude as clients those employees who are merely
fortuitous witnesses.15 3 Second, to avoid situations in which discovery is
virtually precluded by the assertion of the privilege, relief is provided for the
party desiring discovery on a showing that production is justified due to
exigent circumstances. 151
B. The Proposal
Under the proposal, when all other requirements for invoking the privilege
are satisfied, the assertion by a party that the communication sought by an
adversary is between the corporation's attorney and a corporate employee
establishes a prima facie showing of privilege. 5 5 This is qualified by a
requirement that the party assert the privilege in good faith.' 5 6 For example,
the assertion of the privilege may effectively prevent discovery of all evidence
possessed by the asserting party. Assume that one party requests production
of one thousand documents and the adversary claims the attorney-client
privilege for nine hundred and ninety documents. If the ten documents
voluntarily produced prove to be only peripherally related to the litigation,
the likelihood of a bad faith assertion may be high. In such cases, after an
allegation of bad faith by the adversary, the judge should order an in camera
inspection of all questioned attorney-client communications. 1s7 When there
153. See notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 511-12. Prior to the codification of the work
product doctrine in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), see note 146 supra, some courts
referred to the Hickman required showing as "necessity or justification." 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 89, § 2025, at 213. Other courts have referred to it as "good cause," id. at 214, a
phrase that has been deleted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid confusion. Id. §
2205, at 594-606.
155. This approach, advocated in 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2296 at 566-67, was adopted
in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
156. Good faith assertion is particularly desirable in complex litigation in which a countless
number of documents may be involved. The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures stated that "(d]ilatory and abusive conduct occurs far too frequently in
complex litigation. . . . [and] may take the form of . . . bad faith claims of privilege or
confidentiality." National Comm'n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Report to
the President & the Attorney General 82 (1979) (footnote omitted).
157. Courts employ in camera inspection of allegedly privileged documents when military and
diplomatic secrets are not in issue. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1339 n.65 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
see, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 572 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 635-36 (7th
Cir. 1969); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 142 (D. Del. 1977); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Md. 1974). If the communication requested during
discovery emanates from foreign office employees of a multinational corporation, a problem may
arise in amassing widely dispersed documents for in camera inspection. This issue can be
resolved, however, by recognizing that an attorney for a multinational corporation must initially
centralize all relevant communications to represent the corporation effectively. The production
order for in camera review may be directed at the attorney, thereby alleviating this potential
problem.
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are voluminous documents for which the privilege is claimed, the judge can
appoint a special master to alleviate any burden imposed on the court.'3 8 If
the suspected bad faith assertion of the privilege is confirmed, the proposed
sanction is the complete retraction of the privilege. 15 9 The severity of this
sanction will deter a corporation from attempting to funnel evidence.
If there is no evidence of a bad faith assertion, 160 the adversary may assert
two other claims to rebut a prima facie showing of privilege-the Hickman
witness exception and the necessity or justification showing. Under the
witness exception, the adversary can attempt to show that the employee
whose communication was designated privileged was only a fortuitous wit-
ness.1 61 Witness status can be determined by a deposition of the employee,
whereby the adversary's attorney inquires into the circumstances by which the
employee gleaned the knowledge he subsequently communicated to the corpo-
158. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 governs the appointment of masters in federal courts,
Although the rule provides that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule,"
see C. Wright, supra note 16, § 97, at 485, there are numerous cases in which courts faced
with privilege motions have employed special masters. See, e.g., Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633,
635 (7th Cir. 1969) (court approved of master reviewing documents in camera); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 380 (D.D.C. 1978) ("Because these motions involved
complicated issues and over 700 documents, the Court appointed a Special Master for the purpose
of ruling on these privilege claims." (footnote omitted)); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65
F.R.D. 26, 32 (D. Md. 1974) (master appointed to "appraise the applicability of ... privilege" to
approximately 720 documents); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 793 (D. Del.
1954) (master appointed to rule on documents, but if any documents are not governed by privilege
guidelines of opinion, they should be referred back to presiding judge).
159. Improper assertions of privilege can cause the imposition of sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). Note, Discovery of Government Documents and the Official
Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 172 (1976). Sanctions are beginning to assume a
more important role in contemporary litigation. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam) (most severe spectrum of sanctions
must be available to court in appropriate instances); Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) ("in this day of burgeoning,
costily and protracted litigation courts should not shrink from imposing harsh sanctions where...
they are clearly warranted"); National Comm'n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures, supra note 156, at 81-92. The Commission stated that "[d]ilatory behavior has often gone
unchecked because lawyers have been reluctant to request, and judges hesitant to impose,
sanctions. Both judges and lawyers should become more aware of the sanctions available and
more willing to turn to them in appropriate circumstances." Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, because the client is a corporation, the fears of an unfair assumption by the client of
the burden for the attorney's action are not as warranted as when an individual defendant Is
charged with a crime. The National Commission has recommended that the "reluctance to punish
a client for the wrongful acts of its counsel should not deter a judge from imposing sanctions." Id.
at 85.
160. This initial determination is not an attempt to foster a "case by case" approach. Instead,
it is merely a safeguard designed to check any funneling abuse made possible by the broad basis
of this approach. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
161. For example, filing clerks who merely view material that documents illegal activity are
witnesses. As Ws, see diagram on p. 1290 supra, they are outside the client box, and therefore,
the privilege does not attach to communications the Ws have with counsel. The adversary would
be able to depose these employee-witnesses to uncover the information they possess.
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ration's attorney. This procedure is always available because any corporate
employee may be deposed to elicit the information he possesses. 62
When the employee was obviously only a witness, counsel may be invoking
the attorney-client privilege to delay the litigation. ' 63 Use of the privilege as a
delaying tactic is usually not evident when only one attorney-client communi-
cation is involved. Rather, the concern is with a recurring pattern of bad faith
assertion that results in an appreciable time loss. In such a case, discovery of
witness communications should be ordered. Because delaying litigation is less
serious than an attempt to funnel all evidence to create a "zone of silence,
'1 6 4
however, discovery should be limited to the communications in question.
The second option left to the adversary is the showing of necessity or
justification that would defeat the assertion of the privilege. This relief is
appropriate only when the absoluteness of the privilege that attaches to
individual clients is a discordant feature of the corporate attorney-client
privilege.' 6 s Historically, the attorney-client privilege was structured around
the individual,' 66 partially because of the overlap of the privilege against
self-incrimination.' 67 Corporations are not able to assert this latter privi-
lege.' 68 Accordingly, it is appropriate that the extension of the attorney-client
privilege to corporations be accompanied by suitable modifications that
account for the differences between the corporate and the individual client.' 6 9
Production of otherwise privileged matter, however, should be a "rare"
occurrence, to preserve the predictability of the suggested approach.
A party claiming necessity or justification must prove that it is realistically
impossible for him to prepare his case without access to data contained in
privileged communications. For example, assume that the key corporate
employee in an illegal price fixing scheme flees the jurisdiction after telling the
corporate attorney where he has hidden the records, and that the other
participants were not informed as to major portions of the scheme. A request
by opposing counsel for the location of the hidden files, even though this
162. See note 180 infra.
163. See note 156 supra. This would contravene the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, DR 7-102 (1976).
164. See Simon, supra note 2, at 955.
165. See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388 P.2d 700, 709,
36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964) (en banc).
166. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1962),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
167. See C. McCormick, supra note 3, § 87, at 176.
168. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. at 773. The Supreme Court
has denied the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination to corporations. Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1943);
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1923); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
382 (1911).
169. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. at 774-75. See also City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus
and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963); Simon, supra note 2, at 990 ("traditionally the attorney-client
relationship has been a highly personal one ... difficulties will be experienced in protecting the
confidences granted lawyers who serve the highly impersonal and complex corporate organiza-
tions of our time").
19801 1305
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
information is privileged, should be allowed because the attorney is the only
'available person with knowledge of the location. It is realistically impossible
for the party requesting discovery to prepare his case without access to this
information.
The burden of proof for the necessity or justification showing should be on
the party desiring discovery. In the highly unusual situation when the court
grants this relief, 170 the judge should order an in camera review to limit the
production of documents to those portions of the communications that the
adversary needs. For instance, in the preceding hypothetical, the attorney
would be obliged to disclose only the location of the hidden files and not the
substance of other conversations with the employee. A further example of a
necessity or justification situation arises when a corporation has worldwide
field offices. 17' The time and money needed to utilize avenues of discovery,
such as depositions and interrogatories, may necessitate some intrusion into
the data amassed by the adversary's attorney. In this situation, the judge can
again order an in camera review of the communications so that production is
confined to information that is otherwise inaccessible because of the multina-
tional nature of the corporation. 172
The infrequency with which a necessity or justification claim would be
granted results in an emphasis on preservation of the privilege. This is
necessary to ensure predictability and thereby preserve the policy of encourag-
ing open communications between the attorney and the client. Frequent
allowance of necessity or justification showings could instill deep apprehen-
sion in corporate employees. They may become fearful of communicating with
attorneys when counsel can be ordered to disclose incriminating evidence to
the adversary. 173 Therefore, the attorney must be able to assure the employee
that the privilege does attach. The only time this assurance will be misplaced
is in the unusual case in which the necessity or justification showing is
properly set forth by the adversary. Furthermore, the attorney will generally
be cognizant of the unusual circumstance in which the adversary will attempt
to prove that sufficient necessity or justification exists to compel production of
the privileged information.
Additionally, because a ruling on a privilege issue should be separate from
the litigation of the issues, 17 4 a judge who has ruled affirmatively on a
necessity or justification showing should only order production of factual
information that the attorney could have obtained from the adversary's
170. Characterization of this situation as unusual is specifically intended to ensure predicta-
bility. This showing should be analogous to the original work product exception set forth in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947), that it "should be [the] rare situation justifying
production of these matters."
171. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886).
172. For a discussion of widely dispersed communications, see note 157 supra. For a
discussion of the use of a special master, see note 158 suira and accompanying text.
173. See notes 10, 88 supra and accompanying text.
174. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 201, at 416 (1978) ("only those who are
short of vision and memory would insist still that the litigational impact of a successful claim of
privilege is the factor of overriding importance") (footnote omitted).
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employees if discovery had been feasible. 17- He should not be influenced by
policy considerations that underlie the litigation. 176 For example, any difficul-
ties encountered by the adversary in amassing data because of the diversified
nature of the corporation's structure may be overcome by selective discovery
orders.
When the parties in the action are not widely dispersed corporations, the
necessity or justification showing should be more difficult to satisfy. Often, a
need arises to amass a large amount of preparatory information, 7 7 which
may manifest itself in the frequent assertion of the privilege by both sides.
Discovery is often in the parties' mutual self-interest, 78 however, and, at the
pretrial conference, the judge should encourage the parties to exchange
factual data. 179 Furthermore, it must be remembered that the assertion of the
privilege "does not foreclose opposing parties from pursuing all conventional
avenues of discovery made available under the federal rules, including
questioning [any or all] corporate personnel."' 80
This proposal may appear somewhat complex. Ease of application, how-
ever, although a desirable characteristic of any evidentiary rule, cannot be
granted priority over the goals of proper corporate client designation and
predictability of result. The complexity is also necessitated to allow for the
contemporary goal of broad discovery. Therefore, although the path taken is
somewhat circuitous and indirect,'' it has the advantage of leading to the
desired destination. Finally, the freedom afforded the attorney under this
approach should benefit voluntary disclosure programs and prevent the
previously mentioned ethical dilemma 8 2 from arising.
CONCLUSION
In the midst of the confusion resulting from the divergent approaches
presently applied, predictability has fallen by the wayside. Not only may an
attorney be unsure of which approach a court will adopt, he must also
contend with the unpredictable application of an adopted approach. Because
of the integral role of attorneys in the daily functioning of corporations,193 it is
essential to characterize the corporate client in a manner that assures the
175. For example, this ruling should not be influenced by the attitude of a court or of a
legislative body that favors liberal enforcement of the statute that has allegedly been violated.
This further aids the attainment of predictability.
176. See notes 90-91, 175 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 132 supra and accompanying text; cases cited note 131 supra.
178. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
179. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides: "In any action, the court may in its
discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider...
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
180. ABA Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Certiorari at 8, United States v. Upjohn Co., 600
F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1980) (No. 79-886).
181. See Withrow, supra note 67, at 38 (the arena of the corporate attorney-client privilege
"does not appear to be one that lends itself to scholarly treatment.")
182. See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Maddock, The Corporate Law Department, 1952 Harv. Bus. Rev. 119, 119 ("[lore
and more industrial corporations have found a need for the day-to-day counsel of attorneys in
connection with all aspects of their activities."). See generally J.D. Donnell, The Corporate
Counsel: A Role Study (1970).
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effectiveness of the attorney's role. Corporate reliance on legal expertise,
indispensible for compliance with expansive business regulation, requires a
"flexible and generous protection [of the privilege]. No doubt this is obvious,
but as the story of the Emperor's new clothes illustrates, sometimes even a
statement of the obvious is useful."' 84
Karen M. Muller
184. Simon, supra note 2, at 990.
